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For thirteen years, the Center for Pub-lic 'Interest Law (CPIL) has moni-tored the activities of many of the 
state's occupational licensing agencies, 
and has preached a consistent theme. Gov-
ernment·should regulate a particular trade 
or profession only after an honest assess-
ment of the marketplace and any flaws 
which present a threat of irreparable harm 
or prev.ent normal marketplace function-
ing from driving out incompetent, dishon-
est, or impaired practitioners. The licens-
ing alternative should be reserved for 
trades and professions in which incompe-
tence is likely,to cause irreparable harm-
that is, harm for which money cannot 
compensate. If there is likely irreparable 
harm, then a:prior restraint-type barrier to 
entry (licensing) which addresses and pre-
vents that precise harm should be im-
posed; additionally, the licensing agency 
should set industrywide standards of con-
duct and ethics, and police violations of 
those standards through a vigorous en-
forcement program. 
In the absence ·of probable irreparable 
harm, numerous regulatory alternatives to 
licensing should be considered. These in-
clude the posting of a bond to ensure a 
fund to compensate injured consumers, a 
certification program which has the effect 
of disclosing information to consumers 
about the qualifications of a practitioner 
and protects the use of a title, a permit pro-
gram, straightforward disclosure require-
ments, a rule of liability, straight statutory 
prohibitions on certain activities, tax incen-
tives to encourage certain behaviors, anti-
trust litigation to restore the normally-func-
tioning marketplace, etc. 
This fall, the Senate Subcommittee on 
Efficiency and Effectiveness in State 
Boards and Commissions, chaired by Sen-
ator Dan McCorquodale, is scheduled to 
hold a series of interim hearings on the pos-
sible restructuring of several boards, com-
missions, and bureaus within the Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs (DCA). The 
Legislative Analyst has already gone on re-
cord as supporting complete elimination of 
many of the licensing programs to be re-
viewed by the Subcommittee, including the 
agencies which regulate certified public ac-
countants, boxers, barbers, cosmetologists, 
guide dog trainers, cemeteries and crema-
tories, funeral directors and embalmers, 
private investigators, repossessors, secu-
rity guards, electronic and appliance re-
pair dealers, the home furnishings and 
thermal insulation industries, landscape 
architects, certified shorthand reporters, 
and tax preparers. 
Hopefully, the Subcommittee will 
take an in-depth look at various profes-
sions and trades currently regulated by 
DCA licensing boards, determine whether 
licensing is an appropriate regulatory 
mechanism or whether another regula-
tory alternative might better address the 
market flaw which justifies regulation, 
and seriously consider whether some li-
censing boards should be eliminated al-
together, merged with other similar 
boards, or restructured to better achieve 
their public protection goals. CPIL will 
participate in these hearings, and-as the 
only entity in the state which regularly 
monitors and publishes reports on the ac-
tivities of these agencies-offers these 
preliminary comments and suggestions 
with respect to a few of the DCA boards 
to be reviewed by the Subcommittee. 
TAX PREPARER 
PROGRAM 
Based upon the analysis set forth 
above, the Tax Preparer Program (TPP) 
should be abolished (with the exception of 
its bond requirement). We perceive no ir-
reparable harm from the negligent and/or 
erroneous preparation of a tax return. To 
be sure, there may be a harm resulting 
from such negligent preparation-perhaps 
a civil penalty on the taxpayer from the 
IRS or FfB. But this harm is not irrepa-
rable; the civil penalty can be recouped 
from the tax preparer's $5,000 bond, which 
he/she is required to post under recent leg-
islation carried by Senator Dan Boat-
wright. It would appear that this bond is 
sufficient to cover the kind of civil penal-
ties assessable against taxpayers who uti-
lize the services of a tax preparer. Addi-
tionally, the "repeat business" dynamic of 
the normal marketplace has considerable 
force here; no consumer would return to a 
tax preparer who is incompetent and errs 
on tax returns, and that tax preparer will 
eventually go out of business. The bond 
requirement, coupled with the normal 
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functioning of the marketplace, appears 
to be a sufficient regulatory combination 
for this occupation. 
Although TPP referred a few cases of 
criminal conduct by tax preparers to law 
enforcement in 1992-93 (26 cases out of 
1,737 complaints received were referred 
for criminal action), TPP has no jurisdic-
tion to deal with these cases. And other 
than the referral of these 26 cases to law 
enforcement, TPP engaged in negligible 
enforcement activity in 1992-93 (it re-
voked three licenses and filed one accu-
sation). However, it spent 78.1 % of its 
budget on enforcement. 
California is one of only two states 
in the nation which regulates tax prepar-
ers, and the Tax Preparer Program has 
gone in and out of existence twice since 
1973-resulting in no visible difference 
to California consumers. 
In sum, TPP and its registration re-
quirement should be abolished; its bond 
requirement should be retained and 
could be administered by a less costly 




Contrary to the opinion of the Legis-
lative Analyst, CPIL believes the public 
needs an occupational licensing agency 
to regulate certified public accountants 
(CPAs). Many societal actors (e.g., in-
vestors, lenders, government agencies, re-
tirement systems, pension plans) rely on 
the work and the word of CPAs in making 
many different kinds of business decisions. 
The recent crisis which has led to the 
downfall of the savings and loan industry 
is illustrative of the public's need for inde-
pendent, objective, and competent analyses 
and audits of financial data. 
The California Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Bily v. Arthur Young & 
Company, 3 Cal. 4th 370 (Aug. 27, 1992), 
heightens the need for an effective CPA 
board. In that case, the Supreme Court 
essentially immunized CPAs from civil 
liability for professional negligence to 
consumers or members of the public 
other than those with whom they have 
contracted. In other words, "third party" 




pany in reliance on a certified financial 
audit have no recourse in the courts if 
that audit has been negligently prepared; 
only those in "privity of contract" with 
the CPA (i.e., the audited company) may 
sue the CPA for professional negligence. 
In issuing this ruling, the Supreme Court 
overturned a 1986 case which had al-
ways been the law in California with re-
gard to the liability of CPAs to those 
who rely on their word. Whether or not 
we agree with the Court's holding, its 
impact is clear: the Board of Accoun-
tancy is the only remedy for those third-
party victims and is the only mechanism 
which can protect future clients of that 
CPA. The Bily case has done for the ac-
countancy profession what Moradi-
Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 
46 Cal. 3d 287 (1988), did for the insur-
ance industry: Both cases extinguished a 
previously existing civil cause of action 
and forced relatively dormant regulatory 
agencies to provide an exclusive remedy 
to injured consumers and the public in 
general. 
However, reliance on the regulatory 
remedy to detect and sanction competi-
tive abuse is misplaced when it comes 
to the Board of Accountancy. Here, we 
are forced to rely on a cartel structure to 
represent the very different interests of 
the general public. In our view, the cap-
ture of state police power by proprietary 
interests has resulted in the following 
consequences. 
• The barrier to entry into the CPA 
profession administered by the State 
Board is excessive and unclear. Accord-
ing to the Business and Professions Code, 
applicants for CPA licensure must fulfill 
two primary requirements for licensure: 
(I) passage of the nationally standard-
ized CPA exam (section 5082), and (2) 
completion of anywhere from 36 to 48 
months of public accounting experience 
(depending on whether any of this expe-
rience is completed "in the employ" of 
a Board licensee) (section 5083). One year 
of the required experience may be waived 
if a candidate has a college degree in ac-
counting or a related field (section 5084), 
and candidates who lack public accounting 
experience can still qualify for licensure if 
they have sufficient "equivalent experi-
ence" (section 5083(d)). 
With regard to the exam, we recog-
nize that every state uses the same na-
tionally standardized exam and that it is 
probably futile to complain about it. 
However, the pass rate on this exam is 
extraordinarily low (and, by the way, is 
one of the most closely-guarded secrets 
in occupational regulation nationwide). 
Most examinees must take the test at 
COMMENTARY 
least three times to pass all five parts; 
very few even attempt to take and pass 
all five parts on the first try, and the pass 
rate for those who do appears to be 15% 
or less. Any exam which flunks this 
many examinees is clearly testing more 
than the minimum standards of compe-
tence for an entry-level CPA. Even the 
State Bar exam has a 50% pass rate for 
first-time takers. DCA Director Jim Con-
ran recently threatened the Board of 
Landscape Architects with sunset unless 
that agency abandoned the use of a na-
tional exam with a 6% nationwide pass 
rate (9% in California) (see below}, and 
the Board of Accountancy's exam war-
rants the same challenge. 
Then there is an additional barrier to 
entry: the substantial experience require-
ment of section 5083. Exactly what kind 
of experience qualifies toward licensure? 
The legislature has required the Board to 
adopt regulations "establishing the char-
acter and variety of experience necessary 
to fulfill the experience requirements set 
forth in this section" (section 5083(d)). 
So the Board adopted Rule 11.5, Title 16 
of the California Code of Regulations, 
which very generally sets forth various 
kinds of accounting and auditing tasks 
which must be included in any qualify-
ing experience. But Rule 11.5 neglects 
to include an important requirement im-
posed by the Board: All applicants must 
submit at least 500 hours of qualifying 
experience. Is this requirement in the 
statute? No. Is it in the rule which the 
legislature required the Board to adopt? 
No. Well, then how do applicants find 
out about it? It's printed on "Form E," 
the form which the employer(s) of a CPA 
applicant must complete to verify that 
the applicant has gained experience. In 
regulatory parlance, this is called "under-
ground rulemaking"-the enforcement 
of a policy or standard of general appli-
cation without adopting it through the 
rulemaking procedures of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA). 
Additionally, over the past few years, 
the Board has completely overhauled its 
policy as to what qualifies as "experi-
ence" under Rule 11.5. Prior to 1989, the 
Board strictly interpreted the rule to re-
quire applicants to prove "demonstr-
ate[d] satisfactory knowledge" of 17 au-
diting procedures. In response to re-
quests from the professional associa-
tions, the Board changed its interpreta-
tion of this rule in March 1990. Appar-
ently, the Board no longer requires ap-
plicants to have performed an actual 
audit, and instead requires applicants to 
have engaged in experience which "en-
ables the applicant .to demonstrate that 
he/she has an understanding of the re-
quirements of planning and constructing 
an audit with minimum supervision 
which results in full disclosure financial 
statements." 
This change was debated for two 
years and apparently represents a policy 
consensus on the part of the Board and 
the profession. We do not take issue with 
the substance of the change and-to the 
extent that the burdensome licensure re-
quirements are eased for CPA applicants 
such that more can be licensed, enter this 
profession, and give consumers greater 
choice in this area-we endorse it. How-
ever, the way in which the Board accom-
plished this very important policy change 
illustrates its modus operandi. Once again, 
the Board did not sponsor a bill to ini-
tiate a legislative amendment, nor did it 
commence the rulemaking process to 
amend Rule 11.5; either of these pro-
cesses would have given CPA applicants 
and their employers fair notice of the 
standards to which they are held for pur-
poses of CPA licensure. In order to ac-
complish this change, the Board simply 
modified the instructions to employers 
on Form E. Obviously, this particular 
change is not insignificant. In our view, 
the Board's method of adopting this 
change also violates the APA. It deprives 
both CPA applicants and their employers 
of clear licensing criteria and standards 
which the Board is solely responsible for 
promulgating, and enables the Board and 
its Qualifications Committee (see below) 
to engage in arbitrary licensing decisions. 
Finally. the Board has failed to prop-
erly set forth any criteria whatsoever 
which define "equivalent experience" 
(section 5083(d}) for candidates who 
lack public accounting experience. At 
meeting after meeting of this Board, we 
have witnessed members of the Board's 
Qualifications Committee express confu-
sion as to what types of experience it 
should accept as "equivalent." In August 
1990, the Board simply instructed the 
Committee to evaluate these applications 
"on a case-by-case basis"-obviously an 
unacceptable way to run a licensing pro-
gram. Although section 5083(d} clearly 
requires the Board to adopt regulations 
establishing criteria for acceptable "equiv-
alent experience," the Board has yet to 
comply with this directive. 
• Excessive Privatization. The Board 
of Accountancy is a large board, consist-
ing of twelve members. Eight of these 
are Board licensees (seven CPAs and one 
public accountant, a license no longer is-
sued by the Board}, and the other four 
are non-licensee public members. 
As a preliminary matter, we object to 
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the supermajority of professional mem-
bers on this Board. This is not a novel 
objection, either by CPIL or by other 
public interest organizations. The pur-
pose of this Board-and all boards 
within the Department of Consumer Af-
fairs-is to protect consumers from in-
competent, dishonest, and impaired prac-
titioners. This Board is charged with ex-
ercising state police power toward the 
goals of consumer protection, consumer 
information, and consumer choice in the 
marketplace; and, toward those ends, not 
all of its decisions may be in the finan-
cial interests of the CPA profession. The 
presence of an excessive number of prac-
titioners on this Board inhibits this func-
tion, as their statutory charge may con-
flict with their personal and professional 
pecuniary interests. In our view, there is 
no rational justification for the presence 
of professional members on occupational 
licensing boards charged with consumer 
protection; the profession is perfectly ca-
pable of, and very successful in, repre-
senting itself before the Board and the 
legislature. If subject-matter expertise is 
needed for a particular policy decision, 
a small standing advisory panel of prac-
titioners could be created to advise the 
Board. There is simply no reason why 
the actual decisionmakers should or must 
be licensees. 
In addition to the excessive number 
of CPAs on the Board itself, state law 
permits the Board to utilize the services 
of numerous non-Board-member CPAs 
to carry out its licensing and enforce-
ment functions, at an extraordinary cost 
to CPAs (through licensing fees) and to 
consumers (to whom CPAs pass those li-
censing fees). As a result of this authori-
zation, the Board operates largely through 
a massive committee structure, and most 
members of these committees are not ap-
pointed members of the Board. For ex-
ample, under Business and Professions 
Code section 5020, the current member-
ship of the Board's Administrative Com-
mittee, which oversees the Board's en-
forcement program, is 17, and none of 
these individuals are appointed Board 
members. The current membership of the 
Board's Qualifications Committee, which 
reviews the applications and Rule 11.5 
experience completion forms of candi-
dates for licensure (see above), is at least 
20 (it was 26 in 1992), and none of these 
individuals are appointed Board mem-
bers. The Board has at least six other 
standing committees, and most of the 
members of these committees are not 
Board members. These committees are 
not autonomous, but their recommenda-
tions are largely rubberstamped without 
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detailed review by the full Board at its 
quarterly meetings. 
This kind of committee structure is 
unheard of elsewhere in the Department 
of Consumer Affairs. For thirteen years, 
CPIL has monitored almost all other 
DCA agencies, and not one of them is 
permitted to utilize non-Board-member 
private-practice "volunteers" to the ex-
tent this Board does. And this structure 
is not free. In 1990-9 I, the Board and 
its many committees held 65 meetings 
(an average of over one per week!) at a 
cost of $289,000, including $152,000 for 
travel, $26,000 for meeting sites, and 
$111,000 for per diem payments to "vol-
unteers." 
The cost of this use of non-Board-
member "volunteers" is obviously inap-
propriate, but the effect is even more sig-
nificant. This Board is effectively-and 
improperly-delegating its state police 
power licensing and enforcement author-
ities to private individuals. These "vol-
unteers" are able to strongly influence li-
censing and enforcement decisions af-
fecting their colleagues and their com-
petitors, without meaningful accountabil-
ity to the public. 
• Absence of Aggressive Enforce-
ment Program. Contrary to the frequent 
representations of the Board and the CPA 
professional societies, the Board of Ac-
countancy does not have an adequate en-
forcement program. Out of 6,039 inquir-
ies received in 1992-93, the Board gen-
erated only 814 formal complaints, and 
took only 63 disciplinary actions (26 of 
which were stipulated). While these sta-
tistics are extremely low, they actually 
represent an improvement over past 
years, when the Board's enforcement 
program was literally moribund. The en-
tire Lincoln Savings & Loan debacle re-
sulted in the discipline of one CPA's li-
cense by this Board-and that individual 
got straight probation. 
Additionally, the Board spends only 
a little over one-half of its budget on en-
forcement-much less than other boards 
which regulate practitioners who can 
wreak irreparable harm on the public. 
Finally, the Board spends an exces-
sive amount of its enforcement resources 
and energy policing "unlicensed prac-
tice" (i.e., competition for CPAs). Of the 
929 cases the Board says it closed in 
1992-93, 346 were for unlicensed or un-
registered practice. We believe the public 
would be better served if the Board 
would pursue incompetent and dishonest 
CPAs rather than expending its limited 
enforcement resources attempting to 
drive out the competition of the CPA 
profession. 
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• The Board acts more like a cartel 
than a state agency. The State Board of 
Accountancy-controlled by CPAs-ap-
pears more concerned with suppressing 
competition from non-CPAs who are 
lawfully permitted to perform some of 
the same functions as CPAs (such as tax 
preparers and non-CPA accountants 
functioning under Business and Profes-
sions Code section 5052) than with po-
licing its own. For example, the Board 
recently began to enforce Rule 2, Title 
16 of the California Code of Regula-
tions, which prohibits anyone but a CPA 
from using the unmodified terms "ac-
countant" or "accountancy" to describe 
him/herself or offered services. The Board 
claims that consumers are confused by a 
non-CPA's use of these terms, and that 
many consumers believe that someone 
holding him/herself out as an "accoun-
tant" must be licensed by the state. Oth-
ers (including CPIL and non-CPA ac-
countants and their professional associa-
tions) argue that the CPA-controlled 
Board is attempting to capture the use of 
a generic term to prevent the competition 
from truthfully and effectively advertis-
ing in telephone directories and other 
media, in violation of non-CPAs' first 
amendment commercial speech rights 
and due process rights. 
This issue has been litigated for about 
five years, culminating in the California 
Supreme Court's decision in Bonnie 
Moore v. State Board of Accountancy, 2 
Cal. 4th 999 ( 1992), cert. denied, 
_U.S._ (Feb. 22, 1993); CPIL ap-
peared as an amicus curiae on behalf of 
the non-CPA plaintiff Bonnie Moore. In 
a 4-3 decision, the majority of the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held that the 
Board's adoption of Rule 2 was within 
its authority, but that the rule is uncon-
stitutional because it is overly broad. The 
Court ruled that the Board must allow 
non-CPA accountants to use the terms 
"accountant" and "accountancy" in their 
advertising if those terms are accompa-
nied with a disclaimer stating that the 
practitioner is not licensed or that the 
services offered do not require a license. 
Although the Supreme Court found Rule 
2 to be constitutionally defective, the 
Board has not yet changed its rule. 
It is important to note that the Board 
of Accountancy has never claimed that 
Bonnie Moore has held herself out to be 
a certified public accountant or engaged 
in tasks and functions reserved for a cer-
tified public accountant. In other words, 
the Bonnie Moore case does not concern 
allegations of unlicensed practice. Moore 
and her co-plaintiffs are lawfully engaged 




legislature requires no license, and the 
legislature has never precluded non-CPA 
accountants from using the terms "ac-
countant" or "accountancy." The CPA-
controlled Board has assumed that role 
for itself. 
Whereas the profession sees the Board 
as its reflection and its protection, the ac-
tual role of the State Board is to protect 
consumers from incompetent and dis-
honest CPAs, provide accurate informa-
tion to consumers in the marketplace, 
and preserve consumer choice. The State 
Board should be above turf battles be-
tween different segments of the account-
ing profession, and should evenhandedly 
regulate the CPA profession with an eye 
toward consumer protection. The State 
Board belongs to the public, not to the 
CPA profession. 
In sum, the state's licensure of certi-
fied public accountants is justified. How-
ever, the membership of the existing 
State Board of Accountancy should be 
revamped; its licensing exam should be 
scrutinized and it should be required to 
appropriately clarify its other entry stan-
dards; its excessive use of non-Board-
member private-practice CPAs in licens-
ing and enforcement decisionmaking 
should be eliminated; its enforcement 
program should be properly resourced 
and professionalized; and its repeated at-
tempts to protect the CPA profession 
from competition should be declared as 
against public policy. 
BOARD OF 
LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS 
The Board of Landscape Architects 
should be abolished. We perceive no ir-
reparable harm from the incompetent 
preparation of landscape planning and 
design documents. As with tax preparers, 
there may be a harm resulting from such 
incompetence-perhaps monetary injury 
and attorneys' fees for a civil suit. But 
this harm is not irreparable. If the threat-
ened harm is monetary only (as opposed 
to death, serious bodily injury, or other 
irreparable harm), the preferred regula-
tory alternative is the posting of a bond. 
And also as with tax preparers, the "re-
peat business" dynamic of the normal 
marketplace has considerable force here; 
no consumer would return to or recom-
mend a landscape architect who is in-
competent, and that landscape architect 
will eventually go out of business. A 
bond requirement, coupled with the nor-
mal functioning of the marketplace, ap-
pears to be a sufficient regulatory com-
bination for this profession. 
A properly functioning occupational 
licensing agency has three roles: 
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( 1) formulation and administration of 
a barrier to entry (e.g., exam(s), educa-
tional requirement, experience require-
ment, or combination thereof) which is 
capable of and tailored to preventing in-
competent people from practice, because 
incompetent practice will cause irrepara-
ble harm to the public; 
(2) the establishment of industrywide 
standards of professional conduct and 
behavior for licensees which protect the 
public from the irreparable harm which 
justifies licensing; and 
(3) aggressive policing of violations 
of those professional standards through 
a vigorous enforcement program. 
Evaluating the Board of Landscape 
Architects on these three criteria, we 
conclude that the Board has failed in all 
three areas. 
• Barrier to Entry. For many years, 
the Board has administered a nationally 
standardized licensing exam which has 
an extremely low pass rate. The 199 I na-
tional pass rate on the Board's exam was 
6%; the California pass rate was 9%. 
These 1991 figures are not unusual; for 
several years, the Board expressed some 
dissatisfaction with the national organi-
zation which prepared the test but took 
no action because licensees and prospec-
tive licensees wanted to preserve license 
reciprocity with other states. In other 
words, the Board kept using this licens-
ing exam in order to enable California 
licensees to practice in other states! 
In December 1991, DCA Director Jim 
Conran expressed serious concerns about 
the Board's continued use of this exam. 
DCA's Central Testing Unit examined the 
test, concluded that numerous items were 
not related to the practice of landscape ar-
chitecture, and identified several key prob-
lems with the development and grading of 
the exam. Conran directly told the Board 
that he would support a bill calling for its 
sunset unless it abandoned use of the na-
tional exam and developed its own exam 
which tests minimum standards of compe-
tence instead of "mastery" of landscape ar-
chitecture. Regarding the reciprocity issue, 
Conran properly told the Board that "the 
fundamental purpose of state licensing pro-
grams is to protect the public of the state 
issuing the license. Reciprocity can only 
be an incidental benefit, not the primary 
reason for state licensure." Under Conran's 
threat-and only under his threat, the 
Board broke from the national organization 
and has developed its own test. The first 
administration of the new test occurred in 
June 1993, and the pass rate apparently ex-
ceeded 40%. While this is a substantial im-
provement over the national exam pass 
rate, it is still quite low for people who are 
required to have six years of education 
and/or experience. 
In other words, the Board has finally 
revamped its entry criteria only in re-
sponse to the threats of a particularly ag-
gressive DCA Director. Left to its own 
devices, who knows how long the Board 
would have continued to impose the ar-
tificial barrier to entry into the landscape 
architecture profession in California. 
• Establishing Professional Stan-
dards. The Board does literally no stan-
dard-setting for the practice of landscape 
architecture in California. The only reg-
ulations the Board has ever adopted per-
tain to its licensing exam and the general 
barrier to entry into the profession in 
California. Outside of one provision 
which requires landscape architects to 
include their license number in advertis-
ing, not one Board regulation pertains to 
post-entry standards of conduct. 
• Enforcement. And the Board's en-
forcement program is non-existent. The 
Board received only 59 complaints in 
1992-93, and only 43 complaints in 
1991-92 (and 33 of those were from 
members of the profession, presumably 
complaining about unlicensed practice). 
The Board did not take one disciplinary 
action during either year. To our knowl-
edge, this Board has revoked only two 
licenses in the past five years. It spends 
only 25% of its budget on enforcement. 
If Senator Boatwright's well-known reg-
ulatory agency evaluation benchmark 
("enforcement, enforcement, enforce-
ment!") is applied honestly to this Board, 
it flunks. 
In short, the Board's licensing scheme 
serves primarily to protect existing mem-
bers of the profession from competition, 
which does not serve public protection 
or public choice in the marketplace. And 
in the two other areas of traditional oc-
cupational licensing agency function, it 
does nothing of value toward its consumer 
protection mandate. The Board should be 
abolished and replaced with a bond re-
quirement. 
During the many years in which we 
have advocated abolition of this Board, 
we have heard well-articulated and pas-
sionate pleas from members of the pro-
fession about the positive contributions 
made by landscape architects. For exam-
ple, landscape architects implement the 
federal Americans with Disabilities Act 
and statutes requiring water conserva-
tion, soil erosion protection, fire protec-
tion, and habitat creation and restoration. 
We laud these activities, but they have 
nothing to do with the issue before the 
legislature: whether the harm presented 
by incompetent landscape architects is 
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i"eparable ·so as to justify licensure. We 
submit that there is no real risk of irrep-
arable harm; even if there were, this 
Board fails to address it meaningfully. 
The Board .and the members of the 
profession have also set forth a "parade 
of horribles" should the Board and its 
licensure requirement be abolished. Es-
sentially, they .appear to argue that the 
state's failure ·to license landscape archi-
tects will result in the flight of all land-
scape architects from California, such 
that we would be deprived of their ad-
mittedly valuable contributions. This is 
fairly ludicrous, as was the insurance 
industry's similar claim that all insurance 
companies wou'ld abandon California if 
Proposition I 03 passed in I 988 (which 
it did, and-lo and behold-several in-
surance companies still sell policies in 
California!). The notion that any industry 
would abandon the largest and wealthiest 
state in the nation due to governmental 
regulation (or 'lack thereof) is simply not 
credible. 
The profession also claims that land-
scape architects would be unable to pro-
cure liability insurance should the state 
fail to issue a landscape architect license. 
But the presence or absence of a licen-
sure category is •not critical to insurance 
availability; many licensed occupations 
have extraordinary trouble insuring their 
businesses (e.g., the child care industry), 
and many unlicensed occupations have 
no trouble insuring their businesses (e.g., 
owners of retail stores and developers). 
We hear no complaints from landscape 
architects in states which do not license 
them regarding the unavailability of lia-
bility insurance. Besides, landscape ar-
chitects frequently work as subcontrac-
tors to other professionals who maintain 
liability insurance and whose policies 
can be adjusted to cover the work of the 
landscape architect. Even if the profes-
sion is correct that insurance will be 
harder to get should the state abolish the 
licensure requirement, the Insurance 
Commissioner can cure that problem 
with appropriate rulemaking to require 
the insurance industry to issue policies 
commensurate with the risks posed by 
the landscape architecture profession. 
The insurance industry has no reason 
to boycott landscape architects as a 
group. If insurers are so insecure in their 
ability to evaluate the competence and 
hence risk presented by a group of prac-
titioners so as deny coverage categori-
cally, a more precise remedy than the 
Board's full-blown licensing system 
would be "certification" of minimum 
competence through education and/or 
examination with title protection for the 
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term "landscape architect." But there is 
no reason to deny everyone the right to 
advise on landscaping for compensation 
simply because some persons have diffi-
culty obtaining insurance. The require-
ment of a "license" to practice imposes 
unnecessary restraints to solve a phan-
tom problem which-if real-the "certi-
fication" of competence of those using 
the title "landscape architect" would ad-
dress. 
In sum, the Board of Landscape Ar-
chitects and its licensure requirement 
should be abolished and replaced it with 
a required bond, to ensure the availabil-
ity of a fund from which injured con-
sumers could be compensated, and which 
could be less expensively administered 
by the Department of Consumer Affairs. 
At the very most, the Subcommittee 
might consider some sort of certification 
program which would protect use of the 
title "landscape architect." 
BOARD OF 
ARCHITECTURAL EXAMINERS 
CPIL believes that there is a risk of 
irreparable harm (physical injury and/or 
death) due to improperly designed struc-
tures, such that existence of the Board 
of Architectural Examiners is justified. 
CPIL also observes that the Board's 
stringent licensure requirements (eight 
years of education and experience and 
the passage of a nationally standardized 
written test and a California oral exam) 
appear to be screening out incompetent 
architects without being overly burden-
some, as reflected in a 53% pass rate for 
the written exam and a 66% pass rate for 
the oral exam. The Board receives very 
few complaints (293 in 1992-93, 130 of 
which were from members of the profes-
sion presumably complaining about un-
licensed practice) and takes very little 
disciplinary action. 
However, we have four comments 
about the Board's operations. 
• Oral Examination. To qualify for 
licensure, the Board requires applicants 
to pass an extensive multi-day written 
exam provided by the National Council 
of Architectural Registration Boards 
(NCARB) and a one-hour oral examina-
tion administered in California. Recently, 
the Board (and particularly its staff) has 
questioned the continued need for the 
oral exam, because: 
-DCA's Central Testing Unit (CTU) 
has criticized the use of an oral exam in 
addition to a written exam unless there 
are some demonstrated "higher order" 
skills needed to competently practice 
which cannot be tested on a written 
exam. CTU properly questions what the 
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Board's oral exam adds to the extensive 
written exam, and the Board should an-
swer this question. 
-CTU has also criticized the Board's 
method of administering its oral exam, 
noting that it is administered by different 
exam commissioners who have varying 
levels of training and experience, such 
that there is no assurance of consistent 
grading among the various commission-
ers. 
-In spite of the fact that the oral exam 
appears to have problems in content and 
grading, the Board has no appeals pro-
cess for the oral exam. 
-The oral exam is extremely expen-
sive to administer. The Board recently 
had to increase the fee for the oral exam 
to$ I 00 (in addition to the written exam, 
which now costs $490), because its cost 
to administer the oral exam was $255,000 
more than the fee generated! 
The Board should revisit this issue. 
• Written Contract Requirement. The 
Board of Architectural Examiners should 
seek legislation requiring architect-con-
sumer contracts for professional services 
to be in writing; all changes thereafter 
agreed to by the parties should similarly 
be in writing. Many other trades and pro-
fessions have a written contract require-
ment (e.g., attorneys, home improvement 
and swimming pool contractors, appli-
ance repair dealers, automotive repair 
dealers), and they generally serve to pro-
mote clearer communication between li-
censee and consumer and eliminate mid-
or post-project confusion and disputes 
which eventually clog our courts. The 
largest percentage of complaints closed 
by the Board in 1992-93 ( other than un-
licensed practice) concerned contractual 
disputes; the Board could both provide 
greater consumer protection and elimi-
nate these complaints if it adopted a 
written contract requirement. 
The genesis of the written contract re-
quirement is the adhesive relationship 
often extant between licensees and their 
customers. Small builders often use the 
services of architects. They may agree on 
a contract price. But as with many pro-
fessions, it is difficult to arrive at a se-
cure price for services to be rendered in 
the future. Often, the design is subject to 
alteration, or to a new fact or preference 
requiring additional work. How much 
should one charge beyond the agreed 
price? Traditionally, many professionals 
have been in an advantageous position 
in billing; they control a valuable asset 
in which the consumer has invested sub-
stantial moneys. It is not uncommon for 
such professionals, especially for attor-
neys and engineers, to submit a high bill 
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which is totally unexpected for relatively 
minor additional work beyond an agreed-
to price. Often, the submission is made 
shortly before a trial or important hear-
ing by an attorney, or just before a build-
ing permit application must be submitted 
by an engineer. In either case, a kind of 
extortion ensues-one which has been a 
continuing problem for consumers. 
Attorneys are bound by a special fi-
duciary duty to bill fairly; the State Bar's 
attorney discipline system has been 
strengthened recently to assist in such ef-
forts. The Bar has also developed an ex-
tensive fee dispute arbitration system. Fi-
nally, the State Bar Act now requires that 
services expected to exceed $1,000 be 
subject to a written contract to assure the 
enforceability of the amounts charged. 
Other professions and trades have 
also responded in varying degrees to this 
problem, such as the Contractors State 
License Board and the Board of Land-
scape Architects (the latter now requiring 
written contracts). But the boards regu-
lating architects and engineers have 
failed or refused to impose any check on 
the billing abuses borne of adhesive ad-
vantage. In the case of the architect, the 
plans are in the hands of the professional 
and require building permit approval. 
The architect is in a position to render a 
large bill. There may be no practical sub-
stitute in terms of alternative plans. 
There may be a time limit which requires 
acquiescence to an unfair, last-minute 
bill. 
The problem of excessive billing has 
much precedent. The optimum solution 
is to follow the tried and true law of con-
tracts, adjusting appropriately for the ad-
hesive setting which may be likely. This 
means simply that once a price has been 
agreed to, the professional abides by it 
until and unless an alteration is agreed 
to by the customer-and in advance of 
the services to be rendered. The cus-
tomer has the right to say, "I can't afford 
it if it will cost that," "Forget it," or "I 
know someone else who will do it for 
less, even taking into account the value 
of the prior work." This means that an 
original price estimate may change, but 
it will not change based on the unilateral 
imposition of one party. As fair as such 
a rule may appear to be, it is honored in 
the breach by most professionals. The 
Board of Architectural Examiners has 
yet to impose the kind of check which 
is appropriate and warranted. 
• Price Fixing. Architects have tradi-
tionally offered their services for a fee 
which equals a percentage of the final 
project cost, particularly for large com-
mercial projects. Such a formula consti-
10 
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lutes, on its face, an unjustified form of 
horizontal price fixing. Any price formula 
which is unrelated to cost and which fa-
cilitates agreement between competitors 
is a subject of proper concern for a reg-
ulator. The broad enabling acts com-
monly applicable to trade or professional 
regulation expect the regulator to assure 
fair competition and to avoid market-
place abuse, particularly those which 
create a market flaw. Ironically, many 
regulated professions have used the fact 
of regulation to engage in such price fix-
ing-expecting those who enforce anti-
trust law to defer to the oversight pres-
ence of the regulator. Real estate brokers, 
with their traditional commission of 6% 
of sale price for residential properties, 
are a case in point. The imposition of 
8% of project cost as the architect's fee 
includes all of the above abuses. The ar-
chitectural service costs and the project 
costs may have only a very vague rela-
tionship. To the extent that this pricing 
pattern persists, it should be a priority of 
the Board to end it affirmatively. Its task 
is not to represent the economic interests 
of practitioners, nor to facilitate or coun-
tenance economic arrangements which 
create market flaws. Rather, its intended 
task is to address existing market flaws 
and compensate for them in the interests 
of the larger citizenry. 
• Proprietary Specifications. Archi-
tects design major private and public real 
property projects. Their work includes 
more than plans; it includes the specifi-
cation of materials to be used. A common 
historical abuse in this area has been the 
use of "proprietary" or "canned" specifica-
tions. This often occurs when one entity 
has an exclusive dealership for a given 
product. Its distributor is happy to pro-
vide a "canned" specification for a ma-
terial which can only be met by a single 
brand: his. 
For example, a building needs inside 
ceilings. Alpha Product's manufacturer or 
distributor might give to an architect, for 
her use, a prewritten specification for in-
side ceilings of a type, size, and compo-
sition which describes only Alpha Prod-
uct. The easy-to-plug-in canned specifi-
cation may save the architect some work, 
and-if she has an interest in the enter-
prise-perhaps facilitate substantial side 
profit. This practice is often difficult to 
detect. General contractors bidding on 
the project will call the Alpha distributor, 
who will give them all the same high 
price to include in all of their respective 
bids. They all know that this is the ma-
terial which must be used, and they all 
know they are all getting the same high 
price in estimating a bid to build. And 
the architect generally makes 8% of the 
project price. 
Is the Board proactively monitoring 
for these kinds of breaches of fiduciary 
duty? Where? How? 
CONCLUSION 
Congratulations to the Subcommittee 
for taking the kind of proactive look at 
these agencies which the agencies should 
be replicating in their examination of the 
industries they regulate. 
The boards and bureaus selected for 
examination by the Subcommittee-only 
a few of which are discussed above-
vary substantially. A justification for the 
licensure of tax preparers and landscape 
architects is difficult to understand. Al-
though arguments for bonding the for-
mer and certification for the latter could 
be made, a full-blown prior restraint li-
censing system lacks merit. In contrast, 
the existence of licensing boards for ac-
countants and architects has an articul-
able rationale: These professionals are 
capable of wreaking irreparable harm if 
incompetent. But there are serious flaws 
involving both of these boards. The 
Board of Architectural Examiners exhib-
its some promise as a regulatory entity, 
but it has yet to challenge the tribal rules 
of the profession, a common malady 
among regulatory bureaucracies. And as 
to the State Board of Accountancy, it is 
preferable to have no agency than the 
one currently presiding. This agency is 
symptomatic of the worst features of our 
political system: capture of the state by 
a vested profit-stake interest. 
Regrettably, the same interests exces-
sively influence the legislature as well. 
California has no campaign contribution 
limitations for legislative or statewide of-
ficials currently in force. Those with an 
immediate proprietary stake in public 
policies control the agencies empowered 
to act on behalf of all of us. And they 
inhibit our elected representatives from 
providing the countervailing check the 
founding fathers intended. The condition 
precedent to any meaningful regulatory 
reform is thusly framed: The state must 
consider long-run and larger impacts, 
and the state must decide on the merits. 
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